NOTICE AND AGENDA FOR
AZELA Membership/CLE MEETING
Friday, December 8, 2017, 12 Noon to 1:30pm
Location: Jaburg & Wilk, P.C. Conference Room
20th Floor, at 3200 North Central Avenue in Phoenix. Free (validated) parking is available in the parking structure west of the office building. (Kraig Marton, Jeffrey Silence, and David Farren are our hosts.) There is no cost to attend.
The AZELA Board of Directors is meeting at 1:35pm after the Membership CLE Meeting, and the Board agenda is provided at the end of this Notice.
Feel free to bring your lunch and beverage.
1.5 hour CLE certificates will be given to all in
attendance in person or telephonically
This Notice and Agenda prepared and written by Roger A. McKee firstname.lastname@example.org
Chair, AZELA CLE/Membership Meetings
To Attend Telephonically: Members who attend telephonically will be sent CLE certificates upon request to Roger McKee, email@example.com. To attend by phone, all you have to do is pick up your phone and follow these simple instructions.
(1) Dial (605) 472-5814
(2) Enter the meeting ID number: 574-193-032 (followed by the # key)
(3) Put your phones on mute unless you are speaking.
If you run into any problems, dial the Jaburg & Wilk office number (602) 248-1000 and ask for Jeff Silence or Ash (the Jaburg & Wilk I.T. person).
Recent Federal Rules Changes
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 902 amendments
for authentication of ESI
To eliminate (or at least reduce) the burdens of authenticating electronic data (“ESI”), two amendments to the self-authentication provisions of F.R. Evid. Rule 902 became effective on December 1, 2017:
Rule 902. Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating
The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted:
* * *
(13) Certified Records Generated by an Electronic Process or System.
A record generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate result, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent must also meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).
(14) Certified Data Copied From an Electronic Device, Storage Medium or File.
Data copied from an electronic device, storage medium or file, if authenticated by a process of digital identification, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent also must meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11).
The F.R.Evid Advisory Committee’s report explains the rationale for these rules, which eliminates the need for the proponent of the ESI to call a forensic technician (or other sponsoring witness) to testify about his or her background and qualifications, process of conducting a digital forensic examination and more. Instead, authentication now only requires written certification, which will save costs and time. It is imperative to keep in mind that these rules address authenticity only – a proponent of the evidence will still have to overcome relevance, hearsay, and other admissibility hurdles. Unlike the proposed abolishment of the ancient document rule, these proposed rules were generally well-received.
The Committee provided numerous real-world examples that show how frequently these new rules could be invoked. For example, Rule 902(13) could be used:
- To prove that a USB device was connected to a computer at a certain time.
- To prove that a server was used to connect to a particular webpage.
- To prove a person was or was not at a particular event by using pictures and other information on a cell phone.
- To prove association and activity between co-conspirators through text messages.
Likewise, Rule 902(14) could be used to authenticate any type of information taken from a smartphone or other data source, including text messages, photographs and other data.
USDC for AZ LRCiv Amendments
LRCiv 12.1(c): New subpart requires parties to confer and certify efforts to resolve issues before filing a FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion to dismiss a claim or counterclaim (which requirement had been previously imposed by a standard order issued by certain district judges shortly after civil actions were filed):
“(c) Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or for Judgment on the Pleadings. No motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or counterclaim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or motion for judgment on the pleadings on a claim or counterclaim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), will be considered or decided unless the moving party includes a certification that, before filing the motion, the movant notified the opposing party of the issues asserted in the motion and the parties were unable to agree that the pleading was curable in any part by a permissible amendment offered by the pleading party. The movant may comply with this rule through personal, telephonic, or written notice of the issues that it intends to assert in a motion. A motion that does not contain the required certification may be stricken summarily.”
LRCiv 56.1(b): Amended to prohibit replies in support of motions for summary judgment from submitting new statements of facts (codifying case law on this point). A new sentence has been added to the end of this subsection:
“No reply statement of facts may be filed.”
Recent significant cases
Candelaria v. City of Tolleson et al., 2017 WL 6031769 (12-6-17) (Kyle Sherman and Michael Pearson for Plaintiffs, Justin Pierce and Stephen Coleman for Defendants): Candelaria and Hamm are firefighters employed by the Tolleson Fire Dept. who are also members of their firefighters’ union who were disciplined after engaging in certain union activities. They brought this action against the City and certain City officials raising three claims: (1) unlawful retaliation for Plaintiffs’ exercise of their First Amendment right to speak out about matters of public concern, (2) unlawful retaliation for Plaintiffs’ exercise of their First Amendment right to freedom of association, and (3) unlawful retaliation for Plaintiffs’ exercise of their rights under ARS 23-1411 to associate with other firefighters who are union members. Note: ARS 23-1411 states:
“§ 23-1411. Public safety employee organizational rights; definition
- Public safety employees serving any city, town, county or fire district in this state have the right to join employee associations which comply with the laws of this state and have freedom to present proposals and testimony to the governing body of any city, town, county or fire district and their representatives. A person shall not be discharged, disciplined or discriminated against because of the exercise of these rights.
- This section shall not be construed to compel or prohibit in any manner any employee wage and benefit negotiations.
- For the purposes of this section, “public safety employee” includes a probation officer or surveillance officer who is employed by this state or a political subdivision of this state.
The firefighters’ union, and in particular, the Plaintiffs, had been meeting informally with city government leaders to try to persuade them to pass a “meet and confer” ordinance which would provide for the City and the firefighters union to meet and confer to try to reach agreement on various terms of employment by the City (like the PERB ordinance the City of Phoenix adopted decades ago). Plaintiff was later suspended for five shifts allegedly for unrelated union activity. Plaintiff alleged that a substantial motivating factor for his suspension was his union leadership efforts for a met and confer ordinance, and he filed a 42 USC 1983 claim alleging retaliation for exercise of his first amendment right to free speech (advocating for the ordinance).
Immediately after the infamous Yarnell fire that killed 19 firefighters, the Plaintiffs had also allegedly told non-union members of the Fire Dept. that the state firefighters union would not permit non-union members to serve on relief crews being recruited on a volunteer basis to go to Prescott to assist the firefighting efforts there.
The USDC (Judge Tuchi), 2016 WL 3653959, granted summary judgment for the Defendants and the 9th Circuit affirmed, applying the five elements requirements set forth in Eng v. Cooley, 552 F. 3d1062, 1070-1072 (9th Cir., 2009), holding:
- The Yarnell fire non-union volunteer matter did not satisfy the first of the five Eng elements since this was not a matter of “public concern” but was instead a personal dispute (union vs. non-union).
- Assuming that the speech related to getting a meet and confer ordinance adopted by the City was a matter of public concern (the Court declined to agree or disagree with the District Court ruling that this qualified as a matter of “public concern”), there was insufficient evidence of a causal connection between such speech and the discipline imposed (the third Eng factor):
“ . . plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence to support their allegation that the City used its concerns over attempts to exclude non-union members as a pretext to discipline plaintiffs for their meet-and-confer-related speech. Both plaintiffs had acknowledged the City’s concerns about their statements regarding non-union members and acknowledged the relationship between those concerns and the City’s disciplinary action. Furthermore, despite plaintiffs’ steady advocacy for the meet-and-confer policy for several years, the City did not discipline plaintiffs at any time prior to the statements excluding the non-union member, but did launch an investigation within two weeks of learning of plaintiffs’ statements attempting to exclude a non-union member from the fire relief efforts.”
- The 9th Circuit applied the Eng test to the Plaintiffs’ claims under ARS 23-1411 supra, citing only an unpublished (and oft-criticized) decision which applied Eng to EPA (ARS 23-1501) claims, Rowberry v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, 2015 WL 7273136, 5-6 (D. Ariz., 2015).
Non v. Comcast, Inc., 697 Fed. Appx. 920 (9-29-17): Sanctions imposed against plaintiff’s counsel (“Bacon”) in employment case reversed by 9th Circuit because of inadequate prior notice:
“The district court acted contrary to this court’s precedent when it sanctioned Non’s attorney Bacon without sufficient notice of the potential sanctions prior to the hearing on Non’s motion to extend the deadline to complete discovery. See United States v. Tillman, 756 F.3d 1144, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014) (“What began as a status hearing about an e-mail exchange over vouchers ballooned into a full-blown hearing on attorney sanctions. … The question here is not one of interpretation of fair notice; the reality is that, contrary to our precedent, there was no notice.”); Cole v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Idaho, 366 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Weissman v. Quail Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1198 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999)) (“[N]otice require [s] more than that [the attorney] be aware of the sanctionable conduct, but that the district court must provide notice of the potential sanctions and the reasons for the sanction.”). Although the district court held a hearing on the motion to extend the discovery deadline, the district court did not provide Bacon with any notice that it would impose—or even consider—sanctions at the hearing. Therefore, we reverse the sanctions order entered against Bacon.”
U.S. District Court for Arizona cases
Marsteller v. M D Helicopter, Inc., 2017 WL 5479927, case # 2:14 CV 1788 PHX DLR (11-15-17): (Heather Donnell for Plaintiff, Leah Freed for Defendant): Plaintiff brought FCA retaliation claim, 31 USC 3730(h), against employer. Xlnt discussion of when the Court may seal documents filed or to be filed. The Court denied unopposed cross-motions to seal portions of documents to be filed in motion(s) for summary judgment, finding that parties did not meet their high burdens for sealing, and stating the burdens as to documents related to dispositive motions and documents related to tangential motions.
Martinez v. Maricopa County Community College District, 2017 WL 5000333, case # 2:16 CV 1759 PHX NVW (11-1-17) (Edmundo Robaina and Thomas Griffin for Plaintiff, Alanna Brook and Pavneet Uppal for Defendants): A tenured community college math instructor with over thirty years on the job was suspended for one year by the District Chancellor for having charged her students for copyrighted materials that she had photocopied and sold to her students and then refusing a direct order to give refunds to the students. The District has comprehensive procedures in place for discipline of tenured faculty, including a track for suspensions and another track for terminations. She filed a claim for violation of 42 USC 1983-violation of her 14th Amendment due process rights. Judge Wake wrote an order granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and was very critical of the arguments made by the Plaintiff. The Court rejected these arguments:
- The one-year suspension was tantamount to a dismissal and therefore the additional due process provided by the dismissal track should have been followed rather than the track for suspensions. Judge Wake commented:
“A one-year suspension is still a suspension. Indeed, the suspension expired 13 months later, and Martinez returned to work the next Fall semester. To say she was terminated though she returned to work proves only that paper will bear any words written upon it.”
- The suspension track process lacked the fundamental requirements for constitutional procedural due process.
- The Chancellor (Glasper) who made the final decision to suspend her was biased and not impartial. Judge Wake said:
“There is no evidence or even specific allegation of actual bias by Glasper. Similarly, Glasper had no occasion to present evidence of lack of bias. That is not surprising because no such claim was pleaded or subject to discovery. Martinez may not ambush Glasper now on that claim raised first in summary judgment briefing.
In the absence of actual evidence of bias, Martinez appears to argue that a personnel supervisor is disqualified from making a supervisory and disciplinary decision whenever he was involved earlier in the personnel matter. It is irrational to say that Glasper’s acceptance of the Committee’s prior finding of misconduct shows Glasper was biased in imposing lesser sanctions for that very misconduct, which was consistent with the Hearing Committee’s recommendation against dismissal.”
(Note: On 11-30-17, the Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal.)
Litzendorf v. Property Maintenance Solutions LLC et al., 2017 WL 5900830, case # 2:16 CV 271 PHX GMS (Clifford Bendau and Christopher Bendau for Plaintiff, Adam Anderson for Defendant): Plaintiff alleged that he was jointly employed as a residential rental property handyman by two LLCs, one a “property manager” and the other a “property maintenance” service. He claimed he had worked for 50 to 60 hours per week over a long period of time but had been miss-classified as an independent contractor and had not been paid overtime wages. He sued both entities for FLSA OT wages and failure to pay wages pursuant to ARS 23-355. The District Court denied cross-motions for summary judgment, finding disputes on material facts as to both motions.
- The Court listed the material facts in dispute pertaining to whether the relationship was one of employment or independent contractor, under the standards
- Neither employer had over $500,000 in annual gross income so the “enterprise” test for FLSA coverage was not met. The Court held that, since the incomes of both combined exceeded $500,000, under the FLSA “joint employer” test, Chao v. A-One Medical Services, Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 915 (9th Cir,. 2003), if the two defendants were in fact joint employers, the enterprise test for FLSA coverage would be satisfied.
- Even if there was no FLSA “enterprise” coverage for the employer, there could still be FLSA coverage if the employee regularly handled and worked with goods and products that were produced in interstate commerce.
(reviewed by Denise Blommel)
Zuniga v. Fiesta Pediatric Therapy Incorporated, 2017 WL 4337344, case #2:15 1978 PHX DKD (Kraig Marton & Jeffrey Silence for Plaintiff, Christopher Mason for Defendants): Convoluted FLSA case herein healthcare worker suspecting misconduct by employer had provided copies of billing documents to AHCCCS and AZ Board of Occupational Therapy. The employer filed cross-claims for (a) violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 USC 1030 (“CFAA”), (b) “misappropriation”, and (c) breach of fiduciary duty to employer. The Court granted the employee’s motion for partial summary judgment dismissing these claims because:
(a) CFAA claim: Merely accessing a patient file by an employee did not violate the CFAA, there was no evidence of any harm to the employer, nor any evidence that she removed or stole a patient file; and
(b & c) State law claims: The Court cited statutes granting immunity for persons providing evidence or information to these state agencies.
This case also addresses the difficulties presented when the employer fails to keep accurate time records for a non-exempt employee, and pays the employee bi-monthly, thus creating a “baseline of 86.67 hours” for forty hours per week over a bi-monthly pay schedule. When an employee has a day or period of paid holiday, vacation, or leave time, although they are paid for such hours, those hours do not count toward the forty per week calculation to determine whether overtime pay is required. See 29 CFR 778.218 and 778.219.
Brooke v. A-Ventures, LLC, 2017 WL 5624941, case # 2:17 2868 PHX HRH (11-22-17) (Peter Strojnik for Plaintiff, Jennings, Strouss & Salmon for Defendant): Disabled woman sued hotel for lack of handicapped accommodations in violation of ADA Title III. She obtained a default judgment and her lawyer (Peter Strojnik) submitted a fee application seeking an hourly rate of $650.00. The District Court (Judge Holland) reduced the rate down to $350.00:
“Turning then to the lodestar calculation, “[g]enerally, when determining a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant community is the forum in which the district court sits.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). Counsel for plaintiff proposes an hourly rate of $650.00 based upon his skill, experience, and qualifications.27 “To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Id. at 980 (citation omitted). Plaintiff only offers the declaration of her attorney in support.
Defendant argues that $650 an hour is not a reasonable rate. In support of this argument, defendant offers the declaration of Lynda C. Shely, a legal ethics expert. Shely avers that “my opinion is that an hourly rate of $650 is unreasonable and not remotely within the range of average hourly rates charged in Arizona by a small/solo firm lawyer with only 11 years of civil litigation experience and no additional qualifications.”28 Shely avers that her opinion is “further supported by the State Bar of Arizona 2016 Economics of Law Practice in Arizona…survey of hourly rates charged by Arizona lawyers.”29 This publication shows that the median hourly rate for a lawyer with eleven years of experience, such as plaintiff’s attorney, is $279 and that the median hourly rate for lawyers representing plaintiffs in litigation matters is $299.30 This publication further shows that the median rate for lawyers in Maricopa County is $282.31 Shely also avers that she is a sole practitioner with 30 years of experience and her hourly rate is only $360 and that in her experience “[r]ates above $350/hour for lawyers with 10-14 years of experience are charged only by lawyers at large national firms, practicing in specialized areas of law.”32
*7 The court concludes that an hourly rate of $650 for a lawyer with eleven years of experience is unreasonable, but given counsel’s experience with ADA matters, an hourly rate higher than the median rates discussed above is justified. The court finds that an hourly rate of $350 is reasonable.”
Arizona Court of Appeals cases
Mesa Airlines, Inc. v. Condon, 2017 WL 4638171, AZ Ct of Apps case # 1 CA-CV 16 326 (10-17-17) (Eric Lynch for Plaintiff employer, Daryl Williams for Defendant employee): Airline hired pilot (on at-will basis) who needed additional training to qualify for position, and airline agreed to pay cost of such training in exchange for pilot signing promissory note for cost of such training which note would be discharged after one full year of employment after completion of the training but if the pilot ceased employment before the year was completed, he would have to repay the amount of the note subject to proportional reduction/amortization for the time worked after completion of training. The pilot resigned shortly after he completed the training that had been paid for by the airline. Summary judgment for the Plaintiff employer on the promissory note was affirmed. Court of Appeals held that (1) the agreement did not abrogate the pilot’s at-will status by compelling him to work for a full year after training since the pilot could quit at any time subject to the agreed upon training debt, and (2) the sum owed was not an impermissible liquidated damage penalty but instead the actual damages suffered by the airline, and (3) the sum owed pursuant to the note was a legitimate deduction from his final paycheck based upon the terms of the note and was therefore a permissible deduction under ARS 23-352(2).
(reviewed by Jeffrey Silence)
Shield Security & Patrol LLC v. Lionheart Security & Consulting LLC, 2017 WL 4897460, AZ Ct. of Apps case # 1 CA-CV 16-0678 (10-31-17): (Joshua Wheelock for Plaintiff, Mark Svejda for Defendants): Employer sued former employees who formed competing business. Former employee Defendants filed motion to compel arbitration, which was denied by MCSC, and denial of motion to compel was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Holdings:
(1) The Arizona statutes governing arbitration agreements in Title 12 (ARS 12-1501 et seq. and 12-3001 et seq.) do not apply to employment disputes. Therefore, the only statute applicable is the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which applies upon a showing that the business was engaged in interstate commerce, and an alternative method of enforcing an arbitration agreement arising from an employment dispute may be a common law contract action for specific performance of an arbitration agreement.
(2) Where a party seeks to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA, there must be a showing that the business/employer was engaged in interstate commerce.
Useful cases from other jurisdictions
Ly v. County of Fresno, 116 Cal. App. 5th 134, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875 (2017): Three Laotian county correctional officers filed claims against the county for employment discrimination based upon race and national origin and retaliation in violation of CA state law. They also filed parallel workers comp claims for psychiatric injuries as a result of discrimination and retaliation by the County. The workers comp claims resulted in final non-appealed administrative agency adjudications that the County had not engaged in discrimination or retaliation and their claims were denied. The subsequent dismissal of their state court claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of CA employment discrimination law was affirmed on the grounds of claim preclusion based upon the final decisions in the workers comp cases. This same result would happen in AZ. Wehrli v. County of Orange, 175 F.3d 692, 694 (9th Cir. 1999) (according preclusive effect to administrative proceedings “where judicial review of the administrative adjudication was available but unused”); see also Holcombe v. Hosmer, 477 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007) (federal courts must apply state law regarding res judicata to state court judgments). Hernandez v. Gemini Hospice LLC, 2017 WL 1318036, case # 2:16 CV 1486 PHC GMS (4-10-17).
Donlin v. Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc., 2017 WL 4541362 (D.N.M., 2017) (New Mexico counsel for Plaintiff, Shawn Oller for Defendant): This is an xlnt case supporting the right of employment law case plaintiffs to obtain discovery of other reports or allegations of similar discriminatory or retaliatory conduct by an employer which may, depending upon the circumstances of the claim(s), be nationwide, and not just limited to the plaintiff’s workplace. Discovery of all similar claims nationwide permitted where there was evidence that decisionmakers were corporate office persons rather than persons at plaintiff’s worksite.
Morales v. MW Bronx, 2017 WL 4444663 (S.D.N.Y., 2017): Three plaintiffs filed FLSA claims and recovered a total of $6,976.63 in damages. District Court approved award of attorney’s fees of $29,462.50, stating that such fees need have no relation to damages recovered because of statutory intent to create incentive for lawyers to take FLSA cases even where small sums are sought.
Allen v. City of Chicago, 865 F. 3d 936 (7th Cir., 2017): Police detectives were issued cell phones for work use when off-duty. They later unsuccessfully sought FLSA OT compensation for time spent on off-duty cell phone calls, but were unsuccessful because (1) they had failed to keep any records of their time spent on such calls, and (2) the employer did not have a duty to review all of their cell phone records to determine how much time each officer spent and when on such off-duty but work-related calls. But the Court warned that a policy of failing to include such time as work time would violate the FLSA if the officers had produced logs showing such times.
(reviewed by Joshua Carden)
Waverly Heights, Ltd. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 2017 WL 5241175 (11-13-16): V.P. for H.R. of senior care living facility was fired after posting to social media site:
“@realDonaldTrump I am the VP of HR in a comp outside of philly an informal survey of our employees shows 100% AA employees voting Trump!”
Employer argued that she was not eligible for unemployment benefits because she was guilty of “willful misconduct” (the same disqualifying standard applies in AZ) since she violated the employer’s strict social media policy and, although she did not identify her employer by name it would be easy for a reader to determine who her employer was. The Court held that this was not “willful misconduct” and approved unemployment benefits.
Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. American Senior Benefits LLC, 83 N.E. 3d 1085 (Ill. App., 2017): A Bankers Life insurance executive had signed a restrictive covenant restricting him from, inter alia, soliciting or recruiting any Bankers Life employees for employment for a period of two years after his employment ended. His employment ended, and he began a new similar job with a Bankers Life competitor. He then sent “invitations to connect” with him through LinkedIn to three Bankers Life employees he had worked with. Those who accepted his invitation to connect would most likely see a link that would lead to job postings for the new employer. Summary judgment for the new employer was affirmed, with the Court holding that this was insufficient to prove a violation of the restrictive covenant prohibition against soliciting (raiding) against the original employer.
Larsen v. Citibank FSB, 871 F. 3d 1295 (11th Cir., 2017): A provision in a pre-dispute binding arbitration agreement which requires the parties to keep the arbitration decision confidential is substantively unconscionable.
Conclusion of Membership Meeting
(Pick up your CLE certificate or send e-mail to
firstname.lastname@example.org to request it.)
2018 AZELA Calendar
All AZELA meetings and events listed are on Fridays. Jaburg & Wilk has generously let us use their conference room again in 2017 for our Membership/CLE meetings on the dates listed below:
AZELA Annual Convention Friday Feb. 23, 2018
October – TBD
Time & Place of Monthly CLE Meetings: All meetings (except for the Annual Convention) start at 12 noon, at the Jaburg & Wilk conf. room.
CLE Credit Provided: All members in attendance will receive a CLE certificate for 1.5 hours of MCLE credit. If ethics subjects are covered, that time will be indicated on the CLE certificate.
NOTICE AND AGENDA FOR
AZELA BOARD MEETING, Friday, December 8, 2017, at 1:30 pm
Location: Jaburg & Wilk, P.C. Conference Room, 20th Floor, 3200 North Central Avenue in Phoenix. Free (validated) parking is available in the parking structure west of the office building. (Kraig Marton is our host.)
- Dial (605) 472-5814
- Enter the meeting ID number: 574-193-032 (followed by the # key)
- Put your phones on mute unless you are speaking.
Board Meeting (1:30 pm)
- Calling of roll of Board members present (in person and on the phone).
- Review and approval of minutes of Board meeting on November 17, 2017. (Mishka Marshall)
- Treasurer’s Report (Michelle Matheson). Financial report.
- Committee Reports
- Convention Planning Committee (Michelle Matheson (Chair), Suzanne Dohrer, Roger McKee, Mishka Marshall, Jeff Silence, Tony Shaw, and Ariel Henderson). Report on meeting and planned activities, including member survey and notice of upcoming elections. Discussion and possible action.
- Legislative Affairs Committee (Cheri McCracken (Chair), Denise Blommel, Thomas Rogers, Kaitlyn Redfield-Ortiz, Otto Shill, Nathan Smith, Meenoo Chahbazi, Santiago Flores, Jr., Nina Targovnik, and Jim Barton). Report on meeting and planned activities. Highlights of NELA lobbying webinar and takeaways. Discussion and possible action.
- Amicus Committee (Kraig Marton (Chair), Roger McKee, Chris Houk, Stan Lubin, Kevin Koelbel, Nathan Smith, and Joshua Carden). Report on meeting and planned activities. Discussion and possible action.
- Website Committee (Jarrett Haskovec (Chair), Mishka Marshall, Jeffrey Silence). Report on meeting and planned activities. Discussion and possible action.
- Public Outreach Committee (Mishka Marshall (Chair), Ty Frankel, and Meenoo Chahbazi). Report on meeting and planned activities. Discussion and possible action.
- Social/Membership Committee (Michelle Matheson/Rich Harris (Co-chairs), Bill Hobson, Jeff Jacobson, Cheri McCracken, Chris Houk, and Erin Hertzog). Report on meeting and planned activities. Discussion and possible action.
- Report on Advocacy
- HB 2020 (bill and Denise Blommel’s email expressing concerns attached)
- Unfinished Business
- Monitoring and Policing Listserv Access and Eligibility for Membership. Report and recommendations from ad hoc committee chaired by Joshua Carden exploring issue and proposed solutions. Discussion and possible action.
- Proposed Amendments to Bylaws (Michelle Matheson). Discussion on proposed changes to bylaws (attached) aimed at avoiding conflicts of interest among directors and prohibiting retaliation, among other proposed changes. Discussion of what occurred during and after October board meeting in connection with discussion and vote on raising pay of CLE chair that prompted proposed changes. Discussion and possible action.
- Succession Planning (Jarrett Haskovec). Discussion on need to publicize upcoming elections through the listserv and to identify and encourage qualified candidates to run for board and officer positions. Discussion and possible action.
- New Business
- New business
- Future Agenda Items. Requests by Board members and AZELA members for future items for consideration by the Board.
- AZELA D&O/event insurance coverage (Jarrett Haskovec). Discussion of areas for insurance coverage to be sought in any D&O or other liability coverage regarding AZELA activities, including CLE meetings and listserv defamation concerns. Discussion and possible action.
- AZELA’s Potential Involvement in Legislative Affairs and
Initiatives (Roger McKee, Suzanne Dohrer). Presentation regarding restrictions on contributions and endorsements for a 501(c)(6) organization. Discussion and possible action.
- Next Regular Board Meeting Date: January 19, 2018