June

NOTICE AND AGENDA FOR

AZELA Membership/CLE MEETING

Friday, June 30, 2017, 12 Noon to 1:30pm

 

 

Location: Jaburg & Wilk, P.C. Conference Room

20th Floor, at 3200 North Central Avenue in Phoenix.  Free (validated) parking is available in the parking structure west of the office building.  (Kraig Marton, Jeff Silence, and David Farren are our hosts.)  There is no cost to attend.

 

Feel free to bring your lunch and beverage.

1.5 hour CLE certificates will be given to all in attendance

 in person or telephonically (see pages 10-11 infra)

 

(The 59 minute AZELA Board meeting precedes at 11am;

the Board meeting agenda is provided infra)

 

This Notice and Agenda prepared and written by Roger A. McKee rogmckee@cox.net

Chair, AZELA CLE/Membership Meetings

 

To Attend Telephonically: Members who attend telephonically will be sent CLE certificates upon request to Roger McKee, rogmckee@cox.net.  To attend by phone, all you have to do is pick up your phone and follow these simple instructions.

  • Dial (712) 432-1212
  • Enter the meeting ID number: 574-193-032 (followed by the # key)
  • Put your phones on mute unless you are speaking.

 

If you run into any problems, dial the Jaburg & Wilk office number (602) 248-1000 and ask for Jeff Silence or Ash (the Jaburg & Wilk I.T. person).

 

 

 

 

Recent significant cases

 

Ninth Circuit

 

EEOC v. McLane Company, Inc, 857 F. 3d 813 (5-24-17): After remand from the SCOTUS, 137 S. Ct. 1159 (2017), 9th Circuit upholds broad investigatory subpoena powers of the EEOC:

(1) The names, social security numbers, last known addresses, and telephone numbers of employees whom employer required to take strength test as condition of employment were relevant to EEOC investigation of female former employee’s Title VII sex discrimination claim, alleging that she was fired upon her return from maternity leave after she failed test on three attempts, and thus employer had to provide such pedigree information to EEOC; employee’s EEOC charge did not allege discrimination was framed in terms general enough to support either disparate impact or disparate treatment theory, and speaking with other employees who had to take test might cast light on her allegations against employer

(2) EEOC does not have to show particularized necessity of access, beyond showing of mere relevance, to obtain evidence during its investigation of employment discrimination charge

(3) Courts may not condition enforcement of EEOC administrative subpoenas on threshold evidentiary showing that allegations under investigation have merit.

 

Arias v. Raimondo, 2017 WL 2676771 (6-22-17): The 9th Circuit reversed the district court’s FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a retaliation claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act by an “undocumented worker”. The plaintiff alleged that after he filed suit against his employers in state court, the employers’ attorney, acting as their agent, retaliated against him by planning for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to take him into custody at a scheduled deposition and then to remove him from the United States. The Court held that unlike the FLSA wage and hour provisions, its retaliation provisions apply to “any person” and do not require that a defendant be the plaintiff’s employer.

(reviewed by Dan Bonnett)

 

Aghmane v. Bank of America, N.A., 2017 WL 2191516 (5-17-17): Employer’s qualified privilege lost through reckless internal investigation: Plaintiff sued the BANA, her former employer for defamation for having reported that she engaged in criminal activity with respect to a customer withdrawal of funds (the customer was “D.A.”) to a third-party financial institutions database which maintained a list of members’ former employees terminated for knowingly causing or attempting to cause financial loss.  Under these circumstances, the BANA had a qualified privilege which could only be overcome by a showing of “malice”. The District Court granted summary judgment for the BANA, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence presented upon which a trier-of-fact could find malice:

“The record in this case reveals a “she said-she said” conflict based on the statements of Aghmane and D.A.  BANA’s case notes summarizing its fraud analyst’s conversation with D.A., conducted through a foreign language interpreter, indicate D.A. denied giving Aghmane authorization to withdraw funds from her account. But D.A. declined to seek prosecution against anyone or to identify Aghmane in writing. Aghmane told BANA, orally and in writing, that D.A. authorized the transactions. Aghmane also provided BANA with documents showing D.A. owed her money, consistent with Aghmane’s contention that she paid for D.A.’s housing and living expenses when D.A. moved to San Francisco. BANA’s lead investigator on this matter, Karen Muth, never spoke with D.A. And no one from BANA contacted D.A. again after Aghmane told her side of the story. Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could find BANA either knew or reasonably should have known it did not have “conclusive evidence” that Aghmane had engaged in criminal wrongdoing.

A reasonable jury also could find BANA acted recklessly by not further investigating Aghmane’s story. While a negligent investigation alone cannot establish actual malice, . . . . . .evidence of BANA’s complete disregard of Aghmane’s “denials may, by accumulation and by appropriate inferences, show recklessness,” . . . . . Were a jury to find BANA’s failure to investigate “was a product of a deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of facts that might confirm the probable falsity of [the] charges,” it could find actual malice in BANA’s failure to investigate the conflicting accounts after speaking with Aghmane. . . . . . Given BANA’s communication to EWS that it had conclusive evidence that Aghmane engaged in criminal wrongdoing, a reasonable jury could find BANA’s “investigation [to be] grossly inadequate under the circumstances.” . . . . .This, too, could allow a jury to infer actual malice. Id.

(reviewed by Kraig Marton)

 

Kardell v. Lane County, 2017 WL 2645591 (6-20-17): Terminated County employee filed 42 USC 1983 claims for violation of right of free speech and violation of right to pre-termination hearing. District Court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and Ninth Circuit reversed on free speech claim but affirmed on pre-termination hearing claim:  (1) Plaintiff’s complaint to Human Resources that his supervisor was “spending money to conduct outside investigations of meritless allegations” could be found to be a “matter of public concern” entitled to First Amendment protection; and (2) Plaintiff had been told that this termination was a RIF, but he believed it was a pretext for retaliation. Since employees who are RIF’d do not have the right to a pre-termination hearing, Plaintiff’s failure to request such a hearing constituted a waiver of the right.

 

Flanagan v. City of Richmond, 2017 WL 2629106 (6-19-17): A police dept. employee spoke out openly in her workplace about her anti-LGBT views, claiming they were her religious viewpoints. She was terminated for creating a hostile work environment with her “religious views”, and she brought claims for relief under 42 USC 1983 for violations of her constitutional rights to free speech and exercise of religion.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her claims, holding that the employer’s right to maintain a harassment free and discrimination free working environment outweighed her free speech and religious freedom rights.

 

Forsyth v. City of Buena Park, 2017 WL 219977 (5-18-17): Two Buena Park, CA police lieutenants brought FLSA retaliation claims based upon the police chief’s passing over them for promotion after they became plaintiffs in an FLSA action.  The police chief gave as the reasons they were passed over that they were “not loyal” and “not team players”, and the District Court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment.  The Ninth Circuit reversed stating:

(1) “See EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Almost every form of ‘opposition to an unlawful employment practice’ is in some sense ‘disloyal’ to the employer, since it entails a disagreement with the employer’s views and a challenge to the employer’s policies…. If [an adverse employment decision] may be imposed based simply on ‘disloyal’ conduct, it is difficult to see what opposition would remain protected.”). This, combined with other circumstantial evidence of retaliation, such as the temporal proximity of the 2013 non-promotion to the ongoing FLSA lawsuit, the Police Chief’s deviation from longstanding practices in opening up the 2013 promotional to external candidates and evidence by current and former officers that the Police Chief often used the promotion process to punish or reward officers based on their loyalty created triable issues as to whether a retaliatory motive more likely motivated his employment decisions.”

(2) the police chief had given shifting explanations for the non-promotions.

(reviewed by Natalie Virden)

 

Hardie v. NCAA, 2017 WL 2766096 (6-27-16): This is a claim by an African-American athletics coach against the NCAA, brought under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, inter alia, prohibits racial discrimination in “public accommodations” which term includes colleges and schools. The NCAA is a voluntary, unincorporated association of over 1,200 colleges and universities. One of the functions of the NCAA is to develop rules that govern intercollegiate athletics, including rules that limit recruitment of student-athletes. The NCAA adopted a rule which prohibits anyone convicted of a felony from coaching at an NCAA approved athletic event.  He had been convicted of possession of cocaine in 2001, and had been rejected for a coaching position because of the NCAA prohibition.  He argued that the rule violated Title II because it had a “disparate impact” on African-Americans.  The Ninth Circuit first recognized that there is a split of authority as to whether disparate treatment claims are actionable under Title II, and declined to address that issue, deciding that, even if actionable, the Plaintiff had not met his disparate treatment burdens of proof under the SCOTUS Wards Cove rule.  (Note: This decision is consistent with other cases, and goes against the EEOC position that job applicant’s criminal histories should generally not be considered in hiring decisions because persons of color have a greater likelihood of having criminal records because of poverty or diminished opportunities.)

(reviewed by Emily Johnson)

 

Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District, 2017 WL 2622775 (6-1-17) (Shannon Giles and Don Awerkamp for Plaintiffs, Jeffrey Matura and Amanda Taylor for Defendant): ADEA generally applies to employers of 20 or more, but there is no minimum number required with respect to local governmental entities.

 

Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 2017 WL 2723943 (6-26-17): The only relief available for ADA retaliation claims [42 USC 12203(b)] is injunctive relief per the 9th Circuit Alvarado decision.  However, nominal damages are available as a form of injunctive relief.  Plaintiff had prevailed on ADA retaliation claim seeking to prevent employer from trying to coerce waiver of ADA rights through requiring mandatory arbitration of such claims.

 

Sorenson v. City of Caldwell, 2017 WL 2735574 (6-26-17): Evidence was sufficient to prove constructive discharge in violation of ADEA:

“The district court erred by granting summary judgment to Caldwell on Sorenson’s constructive discharge claim. Sorenson presented evidence that: (1) he was subjected to years of age-related harassment by a supervisor, Ken Wheeler; (2) Caldwell officials did not act upon Sorenson’s regular complaints about the harassment; (3) Wheeler violated a directive not to communicate directly with Parks employees like Sorenson, by yelling age-related comments and striking another coworker in front of Sorenson; (4) Caldwell did not terminate Wheeler after this incident, even though a Caldwell official’s comments acknowledged that Wheeler might act violently again; and (5) Sorenson resigned one month after reporting this incident and four days after he learned Wheeler would still be working near Sorenson and in a similar position to the one Wheeler held when he first began harassing Sorenson. Taking these facts in the light most favorable to Sorenson, we conclude that there are triable issues of fact related to whether Sorenson’s “working conditions [became] so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign.”2 See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004); Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Historic discrimination over a number of years [may] provide[ ] the necessary aggravating factor … to justify a constructive discharge.”). The constructive discharge inquiry “is normally a factual question for the jury.” Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). We therefore reverse and remand the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Caldwell on Sorenson’s constructive discharge claim.”

 

Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 2017 WL 2621251 (6-8-17): Arizona case involving sanctions imposed upon corporation’s defense attorneys in product liability case after remand from SCOTUS. Judge M.D. Smith stated in is dissent:

“The deceit and dishonorable conduct of Graeme Hancock and Basil J. Musnuff in this case were unworthy of members of the bar, and their disgrace serves as an admonition to all members of the bar. As the district court noted in its opinion: “Litigation is not a game. It is the time-honored method of seeking the truth, finding the truth, and doing justice. When a corporation and its counsel refuse to produce directly relevant information an opposing party is entitled to receive, they have abandoned these basic principles in favor of their own interests. The little voice in every attorney’s conscience that murmurs turn over all material information was ignored.”

 

U.S. District Court for Arizona

 

Watson v. County of Yavapai, 2017 WL 914608, case # 3:14 CV 8228 PCT NVW (3-8-17) (Jessica Miller and Michael Zoldan for Plaintiff, Georgia Staton and Gordon Lewis for Defendant) Bad Lawyering case: Plaintiff County employee was terminated after a series of disciplinary actions, the merits of which were undisputed.  She brought claims under the ADA and FMLA. After Judge Wake granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on all claims, the County sought an award of attorney’s fees under the ADA attorney’s fees statute, 42 USC 12205.  The Court applied the SCOTUS Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC case and its progeny, and held that the Plaintiff should be liable for the County’s attorney’s fees:

Watson received repeated written notice of her deficient job performance prior to being fired. She received numerous reprimands for missing work functions, questioning co-workers about the length of their bathroom breaks, spending work time penning lengthy diatribes, refusing to talk during meetings with her supervisor, and more. She knew she received these reprimands at the litigation’s outset. This is not a case where a plaintiff began with a plausible theory only to have her claim dismissed after discovery turned up insufficient evidence. Watson received disability accommodations for nine years, received numerous documented reprimands, and knew what conduct of hers triggered them, whether or not she believed the reprimands were warranted. Then upon being fired, she alleged that she was terminated because she asserted her rights under the ADA and FMLA. An employer is not immune from future discrimination claims simply by virtue of having provided accommodations in the past. But such a history has strong inferential force that the employer did not engage in disability discrimination. Watson brought this suit as a naked allegation, lacking an iota of even circumstantial evidence to make it plausible.

Watson’s theory that she was actually fired for seeking disability accommodations despite a cascade of reprimands, or as retaliation for protected complaints, was both “unreasonable” and “frivolous,” placing it squarely within the Christiansburg standard regardless of whether it was brought in subjective bad faith.

Fee awards against plaintiffs will be rare and few cases will require close inquiry. In most failed cases, the minimum substantiality of the allegations will be obvious. But this motion easily gets past that filter. As discussed above and in the summary judgment order, Watson’s assertions lacked any objective basis from their beginning as a summary accusation far into her insubordination, discipline, corrections for workplace disruption, contumacious written attacks on her supervisor, and refusal of directions. And that was after nine years of the County’s perfect compliance with her ADA and FMLA requests. A fee award is warranted for objective unreasonableness and lack of foundation, without need to inquire further into bad faith.

(reviewed by Bill Hobson)

 

O’Neal v. America’s Best Tire LLC, 2017 WL 1311670, case # 2:16 CV 56 PHC DGC (4-5-07) (Michael Zoldan and Clifford Bendau for Plaintiffs, Karen Karr and Brad Denton for Defendants): More bad lawyering: Two original and twelve opt-in Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit FLSA overtime lawsuit against their employers, tires stores with common ownership.  They settled all fourteen claims for a total of $30,000, and agreed to have the court determine attorneys’ fees and costs.  The Plaintiffs sought $141,000 in attorneys’ fees and $6,064 in costs.  After considering the requests and objections and arguments and LRCIv 54.2, Judge Campbell awarded attorneys’ fees of $60,000 and taxable costs of $3,361, because, inter alia:

 

Attorneys’ fees:

 

(1) The number of hours was excessive for many tasks.  The Court, sua sponte, examined the PACER case dockets and found a large volume of almost identical pleadings filed by both counsel in other FLSA cases, indicating that many of the tasks were using templates or boilerplates for which excessive hours were claimed.

(2) Block billing was used, making it impossible for the Court or opposing counsel to determine the reasonableness of the time claimed for a particular task.

(3) All tasks were billed at a minimum of .2 hour even if the task would have taken only a minute or so.

(4) A Ninth Circuit case was quoted, and Judge Campbell concluded:

“The Court concludes that awarding more than $110,000 in attorneys’ fees for the work done in this case, given the familiarity of Plaintiffs’ counsel with the issues litigated and the extent of success, would be unreasonable. In fact, in language relevant to this case, the Ninth Circuit noted that “no reasonable person would pay lawyers $148,000 to win $34,000.” McGinnis, 51 F.3d at 810. The Court concludes that a fee award of $60,000 represents the reasonable value of the work performed by Plaintiffs’ counsel.”

 

Costs recoverable under the FLSA:

 

(5) “Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, costs [‘of the action’] include reasonable out-of-pocket expenses.” Van Dyke v. BTS Container Serv., Inc., No. 08-cv-561-KI, 2009 WL 2997105, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 2009) (citing Smith v. Diffee Ford–Lincoln–Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 969 (10th Cir. 2002)). “Costs of the action “can include costs beyond those normally allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920.” Id. (citing Herold v. Hajoca Corp., 864 F.2d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 1988)) (FLSA’s costs provision authorizes an award of costs as part of a “reasonable attorney’s fee,” which would not be authorized under Rule 54 or 28 U.S.C. § 1920).”

(6) The employers objected to the following costs: (1) $203.70 for obtaining a transcript of the scheduling conference; (2) $2,762.50 in sums paid to Optime Administration, a firm retained to administer the opt-in portion of the case; (3) $170 paid to attempt service on “Max Jones”; and (4) $2,500 in “overhead,” a total that is not itemized or explained.  Judge Campbell denied #1 as unnecessary, and #4 as non-compensable normal law office operating expenses.

 

Arizona Appellate Courts

 

Lipsky v. Safety National Casualty Corporation, 2017 WL 443525, Ct. Apps. Div. One case # 1 CA-CV 15-37 (2-2-17) (Michael Doyle and Erin Faulhaber for Plaintiff, Melanie Pate for Defendant): Plaintiff filed, inter alia, claim for wrongful termination for having filed a workers compensation claim, ARS 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(iii).  Two of the holdings in this case are in the May 19, 2017 AZELA CLE Agenda. Another very useful one is that tort damages include harm to a persons’ credit reputation or score, in paragraph 42.

 

Useful cases from other jurisdictions

 

Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 2017 WL 2374843 (2nd Cir., 6-1-17): The Second Circuit affirms the NLRB Whole Foods decision (employer policy prohibiting all recording and videotaping by employees at the workplace has a “chilling effect” on worker exercise of NLRA right of “concerted action” and is therefore unlawful).

 

Egan v. Delaware River Port Authority, 851 F. 3d 263 (3rd Cir., 2017): For FMLA retaliation claims, the plaintiff’s burden of proof on causation is the mixed-motive test (motivating factor), not the higher “but for” burden, citing 29 C.F.R.  825.220(c).

 

Liguria Foods, Inc. v. Griffith Laboratories, Inc., 2017 WL 976626 (N.D. Iowa, 3-13-17): A “keeper opinion” by Judge Mark W. Bennett condemning the practice of stuffing discovery responses with general and boilerplate objections, and suggesting that such conduct is sanctionable: “I know that I am not alone in my goal of eliminating “boilerplate” responses and other discovery abuses, because the goal is a worthy one.5 As one commentator observed:

Though boilerplate objections are relatively common in modern civil litigation, the legal community can take steps to curb their use. Attorneys and judges alike must recognize the costs these objections impose on the efficient administration of justice and on the legal profession. Only with such an understanding, and an attendant willingness to effectively penalize those who issue boilerplate objections, can their use be reduced. Hopefully, with an increased focus on preventing abusive discovery practices, including boilerplate objections, the legal profession can move toward fairer, more effective discovery practices.6

 

The Court also restated the rule in discovery that any ground not stated in a timely objection to an interrogatory or request for production is waived, unless the court excuses the failure.

See also Fischer v. Forrest, 2017 WL 773694 (S.D.N.Y., 2-28-17): After noting that the defendant included 17 “general objections” in its responses to the discovery requests, the Court quoted from the defendant’s objections to the first two document requests. The defendant objected “to the extent that [they are] overly broad and unduly burdensome, and not likely to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence” and that the requests seek “information already in Plaintiff’s possession.”  The Court held that those objections violate the amended rules in at least four respects. First, the general objections violate Rule 34(b)(2)(B)’s requirement that objections be stated with specificity and Rule 34(b)(2)(C)’s requirement to indicate if responsive material is being withheld because of a specific objection. Thus, “[g]eneral objections should rarely be used after December 1, 2015 unless each such objection applies to each document request.” Second, the defendant’s general objections based on “non-relevance” to the “subject matter of the litigation” and that the discovery is “not likely to lead to the discovery of relevant admissible evidence” are outdated. Because “discovery about ‘subject matter’ no longer is permitted” and because the “2015 amendments deleted” the “likely to lead to the discovery of relevant, admissible evidence” language, “lawyers need to remove [that language] from their jargon.” Third, objections that requests are “overly broad and unduly burdensome” are “meaningless boilerplate” because that “language tells the Court nothing.” Fourth, the discovery responses failed to indicate when the responsive material would be produced.

Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., 2017 WL 2178123 (E.D. Pa., 5-18-17): Gender Dysphoria” (transsexuality) may be a “disability” under the ADA.

 

Delgado Echevarria v. Astra Zeneca Pharmaceutical LP, 856 F. 3d 119 (1 Cir., 2017): Plaintiff employee who had been out on disability leave requested and additional year of leave as an ADA accommodation.  Summary judgment for employer affirmed where employee failed to provide evidence that (1) employer could reasonably accommodate such a lengthy leave, and (2) that it was likely that employee could return to work after the year leave would have expired.

 

Conclusion of Membership Meeting

 

(Pick up your CLE certificate or send e-mail to

rogmckee@cox.net to request it.)

 

2017 AZELA Calendar

 

All AZELA meetings and events listed are on Fridays.  Jaburg & Wilk has generously let us use their conference room again in 2017 for our Membership/CLE meetings on the dates listed below:

 

(No meeting in July)

August 25

September 22

October 20

November 17

December 8

 

Time & Place of Monthly CLE Meetings: All meetings (except for the Annual Convention) start at 12 noon, at the Jaburg & Wilk conf. room.

 

CLE Credit Provided: All members in attendance will receive a CLE certificate for 1.5 hours of MCLE credit. If ethics subjects are covered, that time will be indicated on the CLE certificate.

 

 

 

NOTICE AND AGENDA FOR

AZELA BOARD MEETING, Friday, June 30, 2017, at 11:00 until 11:59am

(CLE meeting at noon; Board meeting precedes CLE meeting)

 

Location: Jaburg & Wilk, P.C. Conference Room, 20th Floor, 3200 North Central Avenue in Phoenix.  Free (validated) parking is available in the parking structure west of the office building.  (Kraig Marton, Jeff Silence and David Farren are our hosts.)

 

Attend Telephonically:

  • Dial (712) 432-1212
  • Enter the meeting ID number: 574-193-032 (followed by the # key)
  • Put your phones on mute unless you are speaking.

 

 

Board Meeting (11:00 am to 11:59am)

 

  1. Calling of roll of Board members present (in person and on the phone).

 

  1. Review and approval of minutes of Board meeting on May 19, 2017. (Mishka Marshall/Suzanne Dohrer)

 

  1. Treasurer’s Report (Michelle Matheson).  Financial report.

 

  1. Committee Reports

 

  1. Convention Planning Committee (Sandy Forbes (Chair), Suzanne Dohrer, Roger McKee, Mishka Marshall, Jeff Silence, Michelle Matheson, Tony Shaw, and Ariel Henderson). Report on meeting and planned activities.  Announcement of resignation of chair.  Discussion and possible action, including appointment of chair on a temporary basis.

 

  1. Legislative Affairs Committee (Cheri McCracken (Chair), Denise Blommel, Thomas Rogers, Kaitlyn Redfield-Ortiz, Otto Shill, Nathan Smith, Meenoo Chahbazi, Santiago Flores, Jr., Nina Targovnik, and Jim Barton). Report on meeting and planned activities.  Discussion and possible action.

 

  1. Amicus Committee (Kraig Marton (Chair), Roger McKee, Chris Houk, Stan Lubin, Kevin Koelbel, Nathan Smith, and Joshua Carden). Report on meeting and planned activities.  Discussion and possible action.

 

  1. Website Committee (Jarrett Haskovec (Chair), Mishka Marshall, Jeffrey Silence). Report on meeting and planned activities.  Discussion and possible action.

 

  1. Public Outreach Committee (Mishka Marshall (Chair), Ty Frankel, and Meenoo Chahbazi). Report on meeting and planned activities.  Discussion and possible action.

 

  1. Social/Membership Committee (Michelle Matheson/Rich Harris (Co-chairs), Bill Hobson, Jeff Jacobson, Cheri McCracken, Chris Houk, Emily Johnson, and Erin Hertzog). Report on meeting and planned activities.  Discussion and possible action.

 

  1. Unfinished Business

 

  1. Membership Renewals and Limiting Listserv Access (Michelle Matheson). Report on renewals and status regarding listserv access for those who have not renewed.  Discussion and possible action.

 

  1. New Business

 

  1. Call for a Special Meeting to Fill Vacancies (Jarrett Haskovec). Discussion regarding calling and scheduling a special meeting to appoint a Member of the Board of Directors and a Vice President to serve the remainder of term.  Such a meeting may take place by means of telephonic conference.  Possible action.

 

  1. Report on NELA Affiliate Leader Workshop and Convention (Jarrett Haskovec, Chris Houk, and Cheri McCracken).

 

  1. Future Agenda Items. Requests by Board Members and AZELA members for future items for consideration by the Board.

 

  1. AZELA D&O/event insurance coverage (Jarrett Haskovec).  Discussion of areas for insurance coverage to be sought in any D&O or other liability coverage regarding AZELA activities, including CLE meetings and listserv defamation concerns.  Discussion and possible action.

 

  1. AZELA’s Potential Involvement in Legislative Affairs and

Initiatives (Roger McKee, Suzanne Dohrer).  Presentation regarding restrictions on contributions and endorsements for a 501(c)(6) organization.  Discussion and possible action.

 

  1. Membership and Convention Pricing (see Board email

exchange dated January 10, 2017).  Discussion and possible action.

 

  1. Next Regular Board Meeting Date: August 25, 2017.

 

Posted in 2017 Monthly CLE Meetings